New Venture Finance Case Study: Twinoptic Executive Summary The business plan for Twinoptic presents an early stage first round deal, but which seeks to raise $5 million. They have a potentially good idea, and a few good people, but no major design work done yet. The founders propose to build a read/write CD-ROM drive, similar to Sony's Minidisk system, but which uses the standard 4.72" CD-ROM format. They feel that Sony has underestimated the inertia of the larger form factor, which is selling 50 million audio discs a year and which holds four times as much information as the smaller Minidisks. Their projected market is for around 5 million units per year. Being able to be both compatible and price competitive with CD-ROM drives are critical assumptions that they make. They plan to design the drive themselves, manufacture prototypes, and license manufacturing overseas. They want to create a partnership with a peripheral manufacturer, who will also be a major investor in the company. The company team appears to be made up of three very qualified people, who have held executive positions at companies in the same industry. It is clear that there is probably a significant market for the technology they propose. If the founders can develop the technology for the amount of money that they propose, this could be a significant opportunity. However, their financials are wildly optimistic. The company will probably need significantly more money than they have projected, the drives will not be as price and performance competitive as they claim, and their sales will be much lower than they claim. In particular, the critical factors of price competitiveness and performance competitiveness appear to be significantly overstated. Their ability to create this technology with low technical risk, and on a $5,000,000 budget, should also be carefully questioned. The biggest danger is that this appears to be a standards play in a commodity market. Twinoptic will be attempting to take market share from multi-billion dollar peripheral manufacturers, who will quickly attempt to retaliate. As a small company, unless they grow very big very quickly, they will not be able to generate the economies of scale necessary to survive. They are basically repackaging existing technology, so it is doubtful they will be able to get sufficient patent protection to prevent entry. Unless they can keep all other manufacturers out, they are going to need to drive a standard to allow interoperability. This will open them up to very fierce competition. Since they do not play to build any manufacturing infrastructure, it is unclear that they can sustain their competitiveness. They may still be able to make significant short term profits by selling their designs, but it is unclear that they can succeed in the long run. However, this may well be sufficient for a profitable exit strategy for the investors. A number of key questions are raised in the next section. There is enough of a potential opportunity with this company that these should be carefully reviewed and answered. These questions raise major doubts about the attractiveness of this proposal. However, if the dangers and issues raised in these questions are sufficiently dealt with, this company should be financed with around $2,000,000, for the founders to build a proof of concept, at a pre-money, pre-dilution valuation of $1,500,000 to $2,500,000. If the founders are able to bring the major corporate partner in to this round, more money should be raised ($3,000,000 to $4,000,000) at a proportionally higher valuation. Strategy There are a lot of key questions about the feasibility of this plan. In regards to their proposed product, the most important are: n Can they design what they say they can, for as little money as they claim? They claim that this product will require no technology breakthroughs, but this is unclear. They have no major design work done yet. A good number to discover would be how much Sony spent developing the Minidisk player. They claim their product will cost $4 to $5 million, over 18 months, to develop. n It seems surprising that they can be fully compatible with existing CD-ROM drives. Is this feasible? n Which generation of CD-ROM drives will their data transfer rates be similar to? The current generation or the generation that will exist when they start shipping? In terms of marketing the product, the most important questions are: n Can they overthrow Sony's Minidisk standard? This seems to be a reasonable thing to do. While Sony's product's smaller size is better for laptop computers, the CD-ROM form factor has quite a bit of inertia. The CD-MO product will have at least 4x the capacity of the Minidisk, which should be compelling. n They plan to manufacture the product for $275 and have a retail price of $550. Is this reasonable for this market? I would expect the multiplier to be closer to 4x to 5x. n What will the cost of CD-ROM drives be when the CD-MO product is released at $550? This price might be competitive at the time the plan was written, but the founders do not seem to be taking in to account the fact that prices may drop by up to 50% and performance increase by up to 100% during the 18 months that they will probably need to release their product. By that time, a CD-ROM drive will probably be $350 less than their product, rather than the claimed $75-$150 difference. n Can they truly build a sustainable company with this? This area is a commodities market, and very large competitors will enter very quickly. There do not seem to be very good barriers to entry, and they will not be able to establish large economies of scale. n Who owns the manufacturing capability they will be using for their product? If it is primarily other peripheral manufacturers, this could pose a much larger danger than if a significant share is independent of these companies. n Will the company be making a standards play with this technology? It appears that they have to in order to be interoperable. This makes the total market size larger, but will truly turn it in to a commodity market. n They project that they will acquire 10% of the CD-ROM market. This seems very high (2-3% might be more reasonable), because it does not take in to account competitors' reactions. n They project that the CD-ROM drive market will be at least 50% bigger than the industry estimates they quote. Why is this? n Will large companies continue to license their design for very long? Since they are not building the manufacturing capability, this will be critical. In particular, their corporate partner is going to want to be able to manufacture drives for a very small royalty. The management team seems capable. They claim 75 years of experience between the three primary founders. However, it is unclear how large some of the companies are that they have executive experience in. Financial Requirements Twinoptics' financial projections appear wildly optimistic. Some of the problems include: n They project to generate more than $1 billion in revenues in their third full year of shipping product, although 75% of this goes to their manufacturing costs, which they have out-sourced. n For the three full years that they are shipping products for, sales and marketing is less than 2.5% of their total revenues. n As pointed out above, these sales numbers seem to be based on the two incorrect assumptions that competition will not arise and that the price of CD-ROM drives will not decrease before they start shipping product. n They only budget a total of $500,000 to sales and marketing for the two years before major product sales start. The company is trying to raise $5,000,000 in the first round of financing, to pretty much cover the entire costs of development. They do not need to raise all of this immediately. Capital Structure Twinoptics' proposed financing structure plans to raise $5,000,000 in the first quarter, $2,000,000 in the year after that, $3,000,000 in the second full year, and $5,000,000 in the third full year. This financing structure is seriously flawed. Unless the company has key patents or major design work they are not disclosing, the pre-money, pre-dilution valuation of the company is probably betewen $1,500,000 and $2,500,000. Raising $5,000,000 for the first round, with 20% of the company reserved for employees, the founders will likely have less than 25% of the company after the first round! However, if they are able to attract a major corporate partner and investor for this first round, they may be able to get a significantly higher valuation and be able to afford more money. A more reasonable financing structure would bring in $2,000,000 for the first round, $5,000,000 in the second round, and perhaps $10,000,000 in the third. This would be augmented by venture leasing to finance their equipment and furniture. The first round milestones would include building a proof of concept, putting the rest of the management team in place, and developing the necessary strategic alliances. The second round milestones would include finishing the product development and starting sales. The third round would fuel company expansion, and a mezzanine round or public offering would probably be required soon after, if they are to sustain the type of growth they have planned. Twinoptics' business plan leaves many major questions to be answered, and appears to have some fundamentally flawed assumptions. If all of these can be dealt with satisfactorily, a reasonable initial offering would be for $2,000,000 at a pre-money, pre-options pool valuation of $2,000,000. Assuming a 15% options pool and 5% for warrants for the venture leases, this would leave the founders and the investors each with 40% of the company. This assumes that they are not able to immediately form a partnership with a corporate partner. Giving this partner certain rights to license the technology they develop would enable significantly more money to be raised this round.